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Antonio Lecuna
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ABSTRACT
Many scholars argue that entrepreneurship concentrates wealth
not only because rich families choose entrepreneurial occupations
more often but also because entrepreneurs tend to earn and save
more income than workers. However, based on panel data
obtained from 54 countries during the period of 2006–2012, this
empirical study found that public policies targeting formal and
informal entrepreneurs are associated with decreased inequalities
in the distribution of income. The data reveal no significant effect
of high-aspiration entrepreneurs or newly registered firms on
income distribution, suggesting that the informal information cap-
tured in the ‘total entrepreneurial activity’ measurement is a cru-
cial factor explaining the variations observed in income inequality.
Because entrepreneurial activity could be particularly successful in
decreasing income inequality if targeted at the informal segments
of society, the novel findings presented here open a new theoret-
ical perspective that contradicts the commonly used conceptual
framework, which tends to associate entrepreneurial activity with
higher-income inequality.
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Because development encompasses more than only economic growth (Sen, 2001),
Naude (2011, p. 34) claims that entrepreneurship scholars should focus on other rele-
vant issues (e.g., income inequality). This study contributes to bridging the empirical
gap between income inequality and entrepreneurship. Income inequality is relevant
because increasing inequality harms the poor and adversely affects the middle class
(Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 2010), whereas entrepreneurship, although vital to eco-
nomic growth (Markin, Swab, & Marshall, 2017, p. 2–3), is typically considered an
essential factor in creating and destroying personal wealth (Choi, 1999, p. 240).
Understanding inequality from the entrepreneurship point of view is very important
because strong evidence suggests that income inequality slows economic growth
CONTACT Antonio Lecuna alecuna@udd.cl
Note: The first version was presented at the annual Sustainability, Ethics, and Entrepreneurship (SEE) Conference
held in May 2016 in Denver. A similar version was presented at the Latin American chapter of INEKA (GIKA-LATAM
2019) Conference held in January 2019 in Concepcion, Chile.
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/




(Atems, 2013). However, entrepreneurship and income inequality tend to move
together (Atems & Shand, 2018), which generates a paradox: if entrepreneurship is
expected to increase income inequality and income inequality is expected to decrease
economic growth, then how can entrepreneurship encourage economic growth?
Maybe we are missing something. This paper enhances our understanding of the ori-
gins of income inequality by investigating the extent to which entrepreneurial activity
is a determining factor. Following Naude (2010), the guiding research questions are
as follows: how much of the observed income inequality is due to entrepreneurship,
and when is entrepreneurship consistent with a reduction in inequalities?
Three independent measures of entrepreneurial activity were used as independent
variables: new business density (NBD), total entrepreneurial activity (TEA), and high-
aspiration entrepreneurship (HAE). Moreover, because TEA captures both formal and
informal entrepreneurs, the effect of informality in entrepreneurship can be predicted.
Drawing upon a cross-country 7-year panel data analysis, this study found that tax-
declaring startups and high-growth entrepreneurs are not significantly associated with
the Gini coefficient (higher Gini implies greater income inequality). However, the
total number of entrepreneurs, including formal and informal entrepreneurs, is nega-
tively correlated with the Gini coefficient. The practical implications suggest that self-
employed individuals at the lower end of the income distribution fundamentally differ
from self-employed individuals at the upper end of the distribution (Tamvada, 2010).
Therefore, ‘entrepreneurship-supporting policies could be particularly successful in
reducing inequality if directed at the low-income, low-wealth, and relatively unedu-
cated segments of society’ (Kimhi, 2010, p. 89) by addressing issues such as the lack
of opportunities (M€uhlb€ock et al., 2018), the different cultural dimensions that affect
entrepreneurship efficiency (Fernandez-Serrano et al., 2018, p. 123), and entrepre-
neurial decision-making under resource scarcity (Nouri & Ahmady, 2018, p. 76–77).
At the same time, innovation and high performance should be targeted despite the
cultural uniqueness (Rigtering, Eggers, Kraus, & Chang, 2017, p. 314) and personality
traits of small family business founders (Franco & Prata, 2019, p. 58–59).
This paper is organised as follows. The empirical evidence associating increasing
entrepreneurial activity with increased income inequality is reviewed before formulat-
ing three ‘pessimistic’ hypotheses, which associate increasing entrepreneurial activity
with increasing income inequality from three entrepreneurial perspectives. Then, the
available data are defined. Subsequently, the statistical methods are described and the
most significant results are reported. The final section analyses the results and offers
a conclusion.
2. Theoretical framework
Kreutzmann (2008) formulated the following contradiction related to the widening
inequality gap: the impossibility of catching up among underdeveloped countries has
become so fixed in people’s minds that the possibility of new exclusions and depend-
encies seems acceptable. Kreutzmanns (2008) contradiction is grounded on the rich
getting richer (RGR) theory, which, in turn, is grounded on the disequalising model.
According to Ljungqvist (1993), the disequalising model argues that even if all
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households are initially equal, in the long run, inequalities will emerge since the off-
spring of such households must choose occupations with different entry costs. As
inequalities increase, wealth accumulation occurs, leading to more enterprise creation
(Ragoubi & El Harbi, 2017). However, after reaching a certain inequality threshold,
this relationship becomes negative (an inverted U-shaped relationship between entre-
preneurship and income inequality (Kuznets, 1995)).
Atems and Shand (2018) also found a positive relationship between entrepreneur-
ship and income inequality. Their results suggest that policies aiming to promote
entrepreneurship increase inequality and may be detrimental to growth, which is con-
sistent with Shane (2009). Entrepreneurialism may well be an amplifier of wealth
inequality in societies for many reasons. For instance, Lippmann, Davis, and Aldrich
(2005) explain that countries with greater income inequality have higher rates of
entrepreneurial activity because ‘those in the upper end of the income distribution
have surplus capital to invest in new business ventures. Conversely, in societies in
which large segments of the population have few financial resources, self-employment
may be the only viable form of employment for many people’.
Meh, 2005, p. 707) further argues that entrepreneurs have higher-saving rates than
workers, mainly because entrepreneurs need to save more since their income is more
irregular (Carter, 2011). The different saving patterns between entrepreneurs and
workers, in turn, result in higher-asset holdings and a higher level of wealth concen-
tration among entrepreneurs across the entire distribution. To support the wealth
accumulation argument, Quadrini (1999) proposes that previous generations of
wealthier families are more likely to be characterised by individuals who have
engaged in entrepreneurial activities than the previous generations of non-entrepre-
neurial families. Thus, because the wealth accumulated during business periods is
generally not depleted immediately, these entrepreneurial families have more consid-
erable resources to start or restart businesses. These features of entrepreneurial family
dynamics reinforce the notion that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur
increases if an individual has inherited wealth because initial capital is required to
establish new enterprises (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a, 1994b).
The inheritance argument is relevant because individuals born into wealth have
more considerable financial resources, significantly increasing the probability of self-
employment entry (Fairlie & Krashinsky, 2012, p. 298). Such entrepreneurs have the
resources to undertake larger-scale ventures before using outside sources of funding,
thereby overcoming liquidity constraints (Bhide, 2000, p. 93). Decreased liquidity
constraints, in turn, enable wealthy entrepreneurs to have higher-opportunity costs
(Cassar, 2006, p. 629). Tamvada (2010) also found patterns of an unequal distribution
of income among entrepreneurs because those individuals who hire others have the
highest returns in terms of consumption. Therefore, growth-enhancing policies could
be a better measure for reducing inequality than policies aiming to encourage entre-
preneurship given that most self-employed and small-scale entrepreneurs have lower
earnings than the average working population (Hamilton, 2000).
Similarly, Frid, Wyman, and Coffey (2016) show that according to the liquidity
constraints theory, low-wealth and moderately wealthy nascent entrepreneurs face
liquidity constraints and are significantly more likely to disengage from the startup
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process during gestation. However, once the gestation process is over, wealth does
not affect the success of a new venture. Therefore, these authors show that talent is
evenly distributed, while the opportunity is not. According to Xavier-Oliveira,
Laplume, and Pathak (2015), in the face of increasing income inequality, ‘more indi-
viduals pursue entrepreneurship regardless of the nature of motivations, though the
majority is expected to be driven by push factors for the betterment of their own eco-
nomic conditions’ (necessity entrepreneurship (Reynolds et al., 2005)). This argument
further supports the use of different measures of entrepreneurial activity given that
different outcomes should be expected from formal, informal, and high-aspiration
entrepreneurs.
In summary, grounded on the RGR theory, the disequalising model, and mainly
on the arguments presented above, the following three hypotheses are addressed
based on the conceptual framework that entrepreneurial activity leads to higher-
income inequality: (H1) increasing the number of formally registered startups
increases income inequalities; (H2) increasing the percentage of high-aspiration entre-
preneurs in terms of expected employment increases income inequalities; and (H3)
increasing the percentage of formal and informal entrepreneurs increases income
inequalities. These hypotheses extend Lecunas (2014) findings, which suggest that
entrepreneurial activity benefits from moderate levels of inequality. However, different
from Lecuna (2014), the three hypotheses explain income inequalities using three dif-
ferent measures of entrepreneurial activity as dependent variables instead of inde-
pendent variables. Furthermore, the results presented here are based on a more
extensive database, including the introduction of a quality measure of entrepreneur-
ship (high-aspiration entrepreneurs). The three measures of entrepreneurial activity
are used because according to the literature, observed results may vary across differ-
ent types of entrepreneurial activities.
The hypotheses further serve as a counterargument to Choi’s (1999) ‘optimistic’
critique of the poor getting poorer hypothesis and Kuznet’s (1955) inverted U-shape
theory, which argues that ‘income inequality increases until a critical income level is
attained, after which inequality begins to decrease’ (Dobson & Ramlogan, 2009, p.
226). This study also revisits ancient views regarding entrepreneurs. According to
Kontosic Pamic and Belullo (2018, p. 1592), entrepreneurs were the ‘merchants’ that
made archaic trade possible. For example, in Babylonia, entrepreneurs managed the
estates and supplies of the palace and its armed forces, while in ancient Greece and
Rome, entrepreneurs controlled handicraft production, trade, and credit. Historically,
entrepreneurs have been considered debased and corrupt.
3. Methods
This study related the degree of income inequality in society as a dependent variable
and three measures of entrepreneurial activity as the main independent variables.
This research used unbalanced panel data from an availability sample of 54 econo-
mies. Fixed effects (FE) were used instead of random effects because of the highly sig-
nificant p-value of the Hausman test, which is unsurprising due to the observed
heterogeneity across the countries. The use of FE is the appropriate estimation
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technique because a certain factor within a country may impact or bias entrepreneur-
ial activity or income inequality. FE models are specifically designed to study the
causes of changes within an entity, including a country, such as exploring the rela-
tionship between entrepreneurship and inequality within a country, which is particu-
larly relevant because each country has characteristics that may influence
entrepreneurial activity. The FE model controls for all time-invariant differences
across countries. Therefore, the estimated coefficients of the FE models cannot be
biased since those time-invariant characteristics are unique to each country. Because
each country is different, the country’s error term and constant (which captures indi-
vidual characteristics) should not be correlated with the others. If the error terms are
correlated, the FE model is not suitable since the inferences may not be correct. For
this study, the FE model removes the effect of those time-invariant characteristics to
assess the net effect of entrepreneurship on income inequalities.
3.1. Sample selection
The sample first included countries that appeared in both the World Bank’s annual
Doing Business report (WBDBR) and the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)
Adult Population Survey data datasets of the 2006–2012 period (the relevant variables
were not available before 2006 and after 2012). China is not included in this sample
due to a lack of data in the WB database. Then, the following six countries were
eliminated because their data related to the macroeconomic variables included in the
WEO database were incomplete: Bolivia, Guatemala, India, Macedonia, Switzerland,
and Uganda. The final elimination (Tunisia and Algeria) reduced the sample to 54
countries, which coincided with the use of the institutional data from the WGI.
As shown in Table A1 (see appendix), the final sample group of 54 countries
mostly consists of ‘very high human development’ countries and no countries from
the ‘low human development’ category. This selection bias is a considerable statistical
limitation of the sample and is a natural consequence of using GEM data. As GEM
country surveys are relatively expensive, developed countries are more likely to be
able to afford the costs of conducting these surveys (Aidis, Estrin, &
Mickiewicz, 2012).
3.2. Measures of income inequality and entrepreneurship
This section defines the dependent and independent variables used to test the hypoth-
eses. The dependent variable in the analysis is income inequality and is measured by
the Gini index, which is a scale ranging from 0 to 100 that calculates the degree of
inequality in a country’s income distribution (higher values indicate greater income
inequalities). Following Lecuna (2014), four secondary sources of information were
used: the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook (CIA The World Factbook),
the United Nations Development Programme indicators (UNDP), the United Nations
University World Institute for Development Economics Research income inequality
database (UNU-WIDER), and the World Bank (WB). The definitions and methodolo-
gies used to calculate the Gini index are practically identical among these four
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sources. In cases in which data were available from more than two sources, the aver-
age during that period was used. The Gini index has been used and validated in
many studies and many contexts. For example, using the Gini index, Jakovcevic,
Dumicic, and And-elinovic (2017) studied Croatia’s insurance gross premiums.
Moreover, this study utilised the 2013 WBDBR and the GEM project to support
the independent variable measurements, and the GEM project is considered the most
essential institution for the provision of relevant information towards understanding
the entrepreneurial phenomenon (Fernandez-Serrano, Berbegal, Velasco, & Exposito,
2018, p. 107). These databases have been used separately in previous publications to
measure the rates of firm formation at the country level, although studies have found
conflicting results depending on the dataset employed (Acs, Desai, & Klapper, 2008).
The 2013 volume of the WBDBR reports the variable NBD, which indicates the num-
ber of newly registered corporations per 1,000 working-age people (those aged
15–64 years). This measure of entrepreneurial activity from 139 company registrars
shows the number of newly registered firms. The GEM project comprises harmon-
ised, internationally comparable data to evaluate entrepreneurship activity across dif-
ferent countries among the adult working-age (18–64 years) population. This database
contains various entrepreneurial measures that are constructed based on a survey
known as the Adult Population Survey (APS). The empirical strategy used two meas-
ures, i.e., TEA and HAE (the definitions of the dependent and independent variables
are provided in Table 1).
The TEA indicates the percentage of the adult population involved in entrepreneurial
activity who are either nascent entrepreneurs or owner-managers of new businesses. The
TEA calculates the percentage of both opportunity-driven entrepreneurship and neces-
sity-based entrepreneurship. While some scholars have sought to distinguish these metrics
in studying the rates of entrepreneurship, other scholars have argued that the distinction
is mostly irrelevant because ‘people can build high-growth, job-creating, wealth-generat-
ing companies even if their motivation for starting a business was a necessity’; meanwhile,
‘the majority of “opportunity” entrepreneurs are not interested in growing their busi-
nesses, and fewer still manage to do so’ (Shane, 2009, p. 142).
Table 1. Definitions of the dependent and independent variables.
Variable Name Definition Mean SD
N
Obs Years
Gini Gini index Measures the degree of inequality in the
distribution of family income in
a country
36 9.28 404 2004-2012
NBD New business density Number of newly registered corporations
per 1,000 working-age people (aged
15–64 years)
4.27 4.87 434 2006-2012
TEA Total entrepreneurial activity % of the population aged 18-64 years
who are either nascent entrepreneurs
or owner managers of new businesses
in logs
8.9% 5.8% 325 2006-2012
HAE High-aspiration entrepreneurs % of TEA expecting to employ at least 5
employees in the following 5 years
in logs
26.7% 10.3% 313 2006-2012

Sources: CIA The World Factbook, UNDP, UNU-WIDER, WB.
Source: WB’s annual Doing Business report (Entrepreneurship Project, June 2013).
Source: GEM Adult Population Survey data, 2006–2012.
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The TEA provides advantages because it focuses on the individual and both formal
and informal work. Similar to the Entrepreneurship Eurobarometer developed by the
Gallup Organization, GEM studies examine the grassroots-level behaviour of individ-
uals who are starting and managing formal and informal businesses; however, GEM
studies cover more countries over a more extended period. This approach provides a
more detailed picture of entrepreneurial activity than other firm-creation measures,
including the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/
Kauffman Entrepreneurship Indicators Program focusing on information found in
official national registry datasets, which are often unreliable in corrupt countries.
The second measure used from the GEM database is HAE, which considers high-
aspiration ventures that are a part of the TEA. The HAE demonstrates the percentage
of the TEA expected to employ at least five employees in the following five years.
The HAE is positively correlated (.24) with the indicator of entrepreneurial activity
developed by the World Bank (NBD), which is unsurprising since both intend to
measure formal high-growth startups. In contrast, the TEA is negatively correlated
with the HAE (.01) and NBD (.03), which is also unsurprising since the informal-
ity information captured by the TEA partially explains the different behaviour pat-
terns that exist between formal and informal entrepreneurs and, hence, accounts for
the non-significant pairwise correlations with high-growth tax-declaring startups (the
correlation coefficients are overall relatively weak, which is a good indication that the
three independent variables do not present multicollinearity issues).
3.3. Control factors in income inequality
The following five variables related to the macroeconomic environment were used in
all specifications: income, unemployment, poverty, inflation, and investments. Income
is measured by the logarithm of the gross domestic product (GDP) (current prices in
U.S. dollars). The values are based on the GDP in national currency converted to
U.S. dollars using market exchange rates (yearly average). Unemployment refers to
the percentage of the total labour force that is unemployed. The unemployment rate
can be defined by either the national definition, the ILO harmonised definition, or
the OECD harmonised definition. Poverty refers to the percentage of the population
living in households with consumption or income per person below the poverty line.
The default poverty line is $1.9 per day in 2011 PPP. Inflation refers to annual per-
centages based on year-to-year changes in average consumer prices. Investments are
expressed as a ratio of the total investment in current local currency and GDP in cur-
rent local currency. Investment is measured by the total value of the gross fixed cap-
ital formation and changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of valuables
for a unit or sector.
According to Berg and Sachs (1988) and Sachs (1989), countries with extreme
income inequality, ceteris paribus, may be prone to ‘bad’ macroeconomic policies. Of
the five macroeconomic controls tested, poverty is likely the most influential.
Mookherjee and Ray (2010, p. 3) claim that poverty and inequality share a strong
and intimate relationship. In the presence of poverty, skilled wages are high relative
to unskilled wages. Hence, a society that is sufficiently poor (but equal) in one
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generation could experience high inequality in the next generation, which could sub-
sequently become entrenched (Mookherjee & Ray, 2010, p. 12), as predicted by the
disequalising model. The previous analysis of poverty can be extended to accommo-
date initial inequality (Mookherjee & Ray, 2010, p. 3), which, for this study, was con-
trolled for by lagging the Gini variable twice: by one and two periods.
Following Lecuna and Chavez (2018), in addition to the macroeconomic controls
and initial inequality, five government (formal) institutional controls were included
using the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). These indicators
are control of corruption, rule of law, voice and accountability, political stability and
absence of violence, and property rights. The control of corruption reflects percep-
tions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both
petty and grand forms of corruption, and ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private
interests. The rule of law reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have con-
fidence in and abide by the rules of society, particularly the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts and the likelihood of crime
and violence. Voice and accountability reflect perceptions of the extent to which a
country’s citizens can participate in selecting their government, freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of association, and free media. Political stability reflects perceptions of
the likelihood that the government could be destabilised or overthrown by unconsti-
tutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism.
Property rights refer to the following question: to what extent are property rights,
including financial assets, protected?
According to Naude (2010), the two sub-disciplines within the respective fields of
economics and management, i.e., development economics and entrepreneurship, have
converged based on the realisation that the institutional framework in a country or
region is important for understanding the outcomes observed in each field, although
few studies have specifically addressed the relationship between these institutional fac-
tors and entrepreneurship (Soriano and Dobon, 2009, p. 236). Countries with high-
income inequality have a significantly greater likelihood, on average, of having weak
institutions (Alesina and Tabellini, 1988; Sachs, 1989). Naude (2010) adds that institu-
tional failures lead to rent economies and rent economies, in turn, lead to income
inequalities (see Table 2 for a description of the control variables).
Finally, the following five additional controls related to ‘basic and business factors’
derived from The Global Competitiveness Report were included: quality of education,
life expectancy, ease of access to loans, flexibility of wage determination, and total tax
rate. The education proxy asks the following question: in your country, how well
does the education system meet the needs of a competitive economy? The health
proxy refers to life expectancy at birth (in years). The personal finance proxy asks the
following question: in your country, how easy is it to obtain a bank loan with only a
good business plan and no collateral? The employment benefits proxy asks the fol-
lowing question: in your country, are wages generally set by a centralised bargaining
process or each company (the questions are answered on a 1 to 7 scale with 7 being
the most desirable answer).
The total tax rate proxy is particularly important because inequalities enhance the
power of economic elites to resist taxation (Sachs, 1989, p. 8). Here, the total amount
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of taxes refers to the sum of the following five different types of taxes and contribu-
tions payable after accounting for deductions and exemptions: profit or corporate
income tax, social contributions and labour taxes paid by the employer, property
taxes, turnover taxes, and other small taxes.
Based on simple pairwise correlations, which are often unreliable and misleading,
among the control variables, the following three institutional indicators stand out as
potential sources of multicollinearity: rule of law, control of corruption, and voice
and accountability. The pairwise correlations between the Gini index and the three
measures of entrepreneurship activity are weak in the case of NBD (.07) and HAE
(.05) but relatively strong in the case of TEA (.56).
4. Results
As shown in the first column of Table 3, seven control variables exhibited significant
coefficients, which corroborated the validity of the control variables as explanatory
factors of income inequality. The highly significant and positive, but relatively small,
coefficient of unemployment suggested that decreasing unemployment by approxi-
mately ten percentage points could improve the Gini coefficient by approximately
two units. The significant (at the 10% level) and negative coefficient of income was
consistent with the theory that links inequality in income distribution to slow capital
accumulation and growth (Mo, 2000). Furthermore, as shown in column one, the
macroeconomic factors seem to have captured most of the effect, followed by basic
and business factors. Moreover, the weak p-values exhibited by the formal institu-
tional variables could indicate issues of multicollinearity; however, the non-significant
effect of initial inequality was surprising. Here, the one- and two-period previous
Gini values are reported, but the additional tests that included the two controls separ-
ately did not reveal any significant results. These findings could suggest that the Gini
coefficient does not significantly change over time.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the control variables.
Variables Source N Obs Mean SD Min Max
Macroeconomic environment
Income WEO 486 4.14 0.46 3.04 5.01
Unemployment WEO 486 8.7% 5.3% 0.7% 31.1%
Poverty WPN 326 1.9% 3.6% 0.0% 23.1%
Inflation WEO 486 4.2% 3.9% 1.6% 51.5%
Investments WEO 486 23.0% 4.6% 13.9% 40.0%
Formal institutions
Control of corruption WGI 486 0.67 1.05 1.12 2.59
Rule of law WGI 486 0.64 0.93 1.03 2.01
Voice and accountability WGI 486 0.63 0.77 1.22 1.83
Property rights GCR 377 4.99 1.02 2.65 6.67
Political stability WGI 486 0.24 0.84 2.20 1.59
Basic and business factors
Quality of education GCR 377 4.06 1.01 2.09 6.24
Life expectancy GCR 377 75.8 5.68 48 83
Ease of access to loans GCR 377 3.44 0.89 1.69 5.51
Flexibility of wage determination GCR 377 4.69 0.99 2.21 6.42
Total tax rate GCR 378 45.4% 15.7% 0.0% 82.4%
Sources: GCR¼ The Global Competitiveness Report; WGI¼World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators;
WEO¼ IMF World Economic Outlook Database; WPN¼World Banks PovcalNet.
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Column two shows that the inclusion of the entrepreneurial-related variables
increased the overall fit of the model from 32% to 42%. Of the three entrepreneurial
measurements, the TEA was the only significant measure as the net number of formal
and informal entrepreneurs increased by approximately 20 percentage points and the
Gini coefficient decreased by approximately 3 points (significant at the 5% level).
This finding contradicts Hypothesis H3, which proposes that total entrepreneurial
activity leads to higher-income inequality. One phenomenon that could explain this
Table 3. Cross-country results of income inequality (Gini), panel data 2006–2012.
Fixed-effects linear regression models
Control Variables Main Effect Collinearity Check
Entrepreneurial activity
New business entry 0.04 0.06
(0.35) (0.65)
High-aspiration entrepreneurs 1.63 2.02
(0.82) (1.08)
Total entrepreneurial activity 15.24 12.20
(2.27)** (1.91)*
Macroeconomic environment
Income 4.25 3.97 3.76
(1.96)* (1.62) (1.64)
Unemployment 19.39 17.42 17.34
(2.89)*** (1.85)* (1.83)*
Poverty 28.02 0.25 2.61
(2.18)** (0.01) (0.07)
Inflation 0.08 6.98 8.40
(0.02) (1.11) (1.35)
Investments 10.06 8.24 5.95
(2.25)** (1.52) (1.12)
Institutional framework
Control of corruption 2.13 0.51
(1.88)* (0.35)
Rule of law 2.43 3.89
(1.50) (1.91)
Voice and accountability 1.79 3.59
(0.84) (1.27)
Property rights 0.25 0.35 0.04
(0.52) (0.61) (0.07)
Political stability 0.06 0.35 0.25
(0.08) (0.33) (0.26)
Basic and business factors
Quality of education 0.68 0.62 0.73
(1.38) (1.20) (1.43)
Life expectancy 0.22 0.03 0.12
(1.63) (0.14) (0.59)
Ease of access to loans 0.82 0.61 0.58
(3.15)*** (1.96)* (1.87)*
Flexibility of wage determination 0.95 0.94 0.99
(2.36)** (2.10)** (2.24)**
Total tax rate 2.32 1.44 0.77
(0.84) (0.47) (0.27)
Initial inequality
Two periods 0.03 0.03 0.05
(0.46) (0.41) (0.61)
One period 0.02 0.032 0.05
(0.31) (0.32) (0.53)
R 2 0.32 0.42 0.38
N 198 140 140
Significance:  p< 0.10;  p< 0.05;  p< 0.01.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-ratios are shown in parentheses.
All independent variables were lagged one period (except for the two-period previous Gini).
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‘optimistic’ result is that in contrast to the RGR theory, the rich have no advantage
over the poor because entrepreneurship consists of discovering opportunities rather
than owning resources. Choi (1999, p. 255) further argues that wealthy entrepreneurs
‘are less likely than the poor to venture off the proven, and beaten track, wherein
consists entrepreneurship’. Another interesting finding shown in column two is the
consistently significant positive coefficient of the flexibility of wage determination,
which is thought provoking because it contradicts classical economic theory regarding
the efficacy of minimum wages. As observed, this variable is based on the following
question: are wages generally set by a centralised bargaining process or each com-
pany? Considering this question, a logical argument suggests that a centralised bar-
gaining process leads to improved employment benefits, including a higher fixed
minimum wage. Therefore, increasing minimum wages, in turn, are strongly associ-
ated with a decrease in income inequalities.
Finally, because estimating an individual joint relationship between income
inequality and its determining factors is not free of a potentially high degree of collin-
earity among the explanatory variables, this study specifically used the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) test as an indicator of collinearity. The following three variables
exhibited extremely high VIF values between 30 and 40: rule of law, control of cor-
ruption, and voice and accountability. After removing these variables, the average
VIF decreased from 7.42 in the ‘main effect’ specification to 3.24 in the ‘collinearity
check’ specification. Moreover, in the final specification, all explanatory factors scored
below the ‘rule of thumb’ cut-off value of 10. In theory, a VIF of 10 or higher is a
concern for collinearity. The VIF cut-off value of 10 was originally suggested by
Marquardt (1970, p. 610) and was subsequently validated by Marquardt (1987),
O’Brien (2007), and Mason and Perreault (1991).
4.1. Potential endogeneity
The direction of causality (or endogeneity) between income inequality and its deter-
mining factors (e.g., entrepreneurial activity) presents a problem that is very difficult
to solve. Indeed, this is why income inequality studies must rely on the underlying
theory. One statistical solution to this endogenous problem is to develop a research
design that observes changes in the dependent variable (i.e., Gini index) over time
and then relates these changes to the explanatory variables, including entrepreneur-
ship. For example, it would be feasible, though not entirely accurate, to examine the
three measures of entrepreneurial activity a few years before the Gini variable. With
this approach, it may be plausible to verify the influential causality of entrepreneur-
ship on income inequality. Therefore, to alleviate (but not eliminate) potential endo-
geneity issues, all independent variables were entered into the regression models with
a one-period (year) lag except for a two-period initial inequality. Notably, however,
the study did not aim to establish causality precisely.
However, even if a correct research design were to be developed, it is impossible
to completely separate Gini from its determining factors because income inequality is
the result of an extremely complex and continuously changing phenomenon that sim-
ultaneously involves several economic, political, cultural, and historical factors. In line
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with this logic, Holland (1986, p. 959) argues that causal inference is impossible with-
out making untested assumptions, which implies that there can be ’no causation with-
out manipulation’. Moreover, it is impossible to accurately estimate how many
periods should be lagged or which control variables should be used. The one-period
lag that comes as a standard measure in most statistical packages is not an entirely
valid approach. For these reasons, and also because endogeneity tests decrease the
number of observations, interpretations of the results only go as far as suggesting an
association or link.
5. Conclusion
In contrast to the growing stream of literature that associates income inequality with
entrepreneurship, this empirical study found that total entrepreneurial activity,
including both formal and informal entrepreneurs, is linked to improving the Gini
coefficient. The statistical results of the proxies that measured tax-declaring registered
startups and high-growth entrepreneurs based on expected employment are not sig-
nificant, which suggests that entrepreneurship-related policies aimed at the informal
sectors of the economy, should have a significant impact in decreasing income
inequalities. The fixed-effects statistical results are based on a panel data availability
sample during the 2006–2012 period (a variance inflation factor cut-off value of 10
was used in the collinearity checks).
5.1. Limitations and future research
An important limitation of this study is that a relationship can never establish a
causal connection. Causality must be shown or inferred from the theory underlying
the phenomenon that is tested empirically (Kendal & Stuart, 1961). It is important to
recall that although all measures of entrepreneurial activity, macroeconomic factors,
government institution factors, and basic and business variables are lagged one year
to alleviate (but not eliminate) potential endogeneity between these variables and the
Gini index, the aim of this study is to test the link between income inequality and
entrepreneurship rather than to determine causation. Therefore, future work should
determine the direction of causality while drawing on different sources of qualita-
tive data.
The WB measure, i.e., new business registrations/population size, could also be
questioned since (i) developing and developed nations are barely comparable; (ii) the
procedures used to register a business are very unevenly regulated across countries;
and (iii) in developed nations, many newly registered firms are ‘shelf businesses’
(holding companies without any activity) or subsidiaries of existing firms.
Furthermore, the GEM measures could present certain methodological issues since
the data are drawn from random population surveys with highly unequal sample sizes
(e.g., 30,000 a year in Spain, 3,000 in Norway, 5,000 in China, etc.). Without appro-
priate sampling weights, using these data as independent variables in a country-level
panel analysis is susceptible to biases (Reynolds et al., 2005).
Future research could also benefit from including cultural and behavioural controls
due to their influence on certain types of entrepreneurship endeavours (Fernandez-
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Serrano et al., 2018, p. 123; Kedmenec & Strasek, 2017, p. 1468; Llanos-Contreras &
Alonso-Dos-Santos, 2018; Pejic Bach, Aleksic, & Merkac-Skok, 2018), such as an
overconfidence proxy (Simon & Kim, 2017, p. 17–18) and certain psychological
motivational proxies (e.g., risk aversion), which are positively correlated with creative
outcomes (Bogdan, Mes, ter, & Matica, 2018, p. 1299) (at least in developed and stable
economies (McCarthy, Puffer, & Lamin, 2018, p. 210)). In addition, a measure of
business background in the family could be used for its prediction of success (Ribeiro
Soriano, 2003, p. 36) and future market anticipation (Rita, Priyanto, Andadari, &
Haryanto, 2018, p. 59), and two different educational controls, i.e., secondary educa-
tion and higher education, could be applied since the former can increase the formal
entrepreneurship rates in certain contexts, while the latter cannot (Jimenez, Matos,
Camara, & Ragland, 2017, p. 354) if planned incorrectly (Olugbola, 2017, p. 14–15).
Additionally, since entrepreneurship is a complex phenomenon that continuously
evolves over time, future research should test other significant measures of entrepre-
neurial activity, including international new ventures (Martin & Javalgi 2018, p. 677),
immigrant entrepreneurship (Emontspool & Servais, 2017, p. 267), and family busi-
nesses (Llanos-Contreras & Alonso-Dos-Santos, 2018, p. 578).
Despite the statistical limitations, the results presented here open the door to fur-
ther delving into some of the relatively less-studied types of entrepreneurial activity
and their relationship with income inequalities. These types of entrepreneurial activity
include informal entrepreneurship. Far from being a hot topic of research (i.e.,
opportunity-oriented, women, senior, innovation-driven), informality has been
observed as a symptom of other constraints (Ihrig & Moe, 2004) but has a large
growth potential based on the necessity to survive as a motivation for entrepreneur-
ship. Some scholars argue that informal entrepreneurship contributes to poverty alle-
viation (Tamvada, 2010). However, before asking the final question, contextual issues
related to the entrepreneurial ecosystem need to be addressed. For example, are there
educational systems promoting entrepreneurship as desirable and achievable and pro-
viding the necessary knowledge, skills, and feelings of self-confidence to prepare stu-
dents to engage in such activities? (Olugbola, 2017). Are there public policies focused
on the development of authentic leadership due to its positive impact on people’s
outcomes (Megeirhi, Kilic, Avci, Afsar, & Abubakar, 2018, p. 938–939) or manage-
ment of knowledge transfer through organisational hierarchy, which is a vital
resource for an increasingly demanding and changing environment? (Benavides-
Espinosa & Roig-Dobon, 2011, p. 117).
Finally, taking into consideration the differences among countries responsible for
encouraging entrepreneurship (Soriano et al., 2010, p. 221), future research should
directly address the following question: can informal entrepreneurship decrease
income inequality in developing economies? In this case, one relevant question is
whether high inequality spurs informal entrepreneurship, which then lowers inequal-
ity over time. If this is true, informal entrepreneurship can serve as a ‘catch-up’
mechanism to reduce income inequality in the long run. Governments playing catch-
up should ‘help’ informal entrepreneurs or should at least tolerate this behaviour and
not interfere (Lecuna & Chavez, 2018). However, governments could make it easier
and more advantageous to encourage informal entrepreneurs to enter the formal
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sector over time (e.g., social security for entrepreneurs) or enhance knowledge-inten-
sive services (i.e., incubators) (Mas-Verdu, Ribeiro, & Dobon, 2010, p. 5) targeting
informal entrepreneurs. Public policies should also avoid centralised control over
wages and regulations that make it difficult to enter markets. Informal entrepreneur-
ship can increase wealth among the poor, turning some of the poor into small busi-
ness owners and others into waged employees.
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Appendix
Table A1. Statistical sample (in parentheses, average Gini, 2004–2012 period).
Very high human development High human development Medium human development
Argentina (46) Bosnia and Herzegovina (35) Dominican Republic (49)
Australia (31) Brazil (55) Egypt (33)
Austria (28) Colombia (57) Indonesia (37)
Belgium (28) Jamaica (45) Jordan (37)
Canada (37) Kazakhstan (31) Morocco (41)
Chile (53) Malaysia (45) Philippines (45)
Croatia (30) Mexico (49) South Africa (64)
Czech Republic (27) Panama (53) Thailand (42)
Denmark (27) Peru (49)
Finland (27) Romania (34)
France (31) Russian Federation (42)
Germany (30) Serbia (30)
Greece (34) Turkey (40)



















Notes: Countries are listed in alphabetical order and subdivided by categories based on the Human Development
Index (HDI) value by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
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